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ABSTRACT 
A KIND OF ADVANCED bibliographic instruction (BI) is proposed that 
involves the study of bodies of literature and their structures. The 
kind of study proposed would give students a basis for independent 
evaluation both of a body of literature and of the claims to cognitive 
authority of its producers. 
Incoming college freshmen are asked about their goals: do they 
aspire to make a lot of money? to be an authority in their fields? 
Most (77 percent in 1987) say that they aim to “become an authority 
in his or her field,” in addition to “being very well-off financially” 
(75.6 percent) (“Fact File,” 1988). It is an understandable ambition; 
in a society in which expert knowledge plays such a central role, 
to be an authority in one’s field is to have one of the most valuable 
assets available, a fund of intellectual capital. One can understand 
much of scientific and scholarly life as being a competitive struggle 
for authority; to be the acknowledged chief authority in one’s field 
is to occupy a commanding position. Authority is desirable; how 
does one get it? and, in particular, is there any way in which 
bibliographic instruction can play a role in getting it? 
First, to avoid misunderstanding, there are two quite distinct 
sorts of authority (Wilson, 1983, pp. 13-35. Compare De George, 1976). 
One is cognitive or epistemic authority, the authority based on claims 
to special knowledge. The other is administrative or “performatory” 
authority, the authority one has by virtue of occupying a position 
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that empowers one to command or sanction or forbid others to do 
things. Cognitive authorities are authorities on something-e.g., 
insects or Buddhist logic. Administrative or performatory authorities 
are not authorities on anything; rather, they are authorized to do 
or command or forbid something, as the judge, “by virtue of the 
authority vested in me,” is able to perform a legal marriage ceremony. 
We are only concerned with cognitive authority here. 
Second, cognitive authority is a matter of social perception and 
recognition. It is not what you “really” know but what others think 
you know that gives you authority; you get cognitive authority by 
getting others to think you know things. You might be the world’s 
greatest expert on a topic, but if no one recognizes you as having 
special knowledge on that topic, you are no authority. You can be 
an authority for just one or two people without being a generally 
recognized authority. You can be an authority for some people while 
others think you are a fraud or a crank. Or you might be a generally 
recognized authority, recognized by all (or almost all) those who have 
an opinion on the matter as really knowing what you’re talking 
about. 
Third, the scope of your authority may be narrow or wide: the 
field or area in which you are thought to be especially knowledgeable 
may be as wide as all physics or as narrow as the history of Corvallis, 
Oregon. And the degree of your authority can vary from slight to 
great. You have some authority if people are inclined to give your 
word more weight than they would give to “ordinary” people’s on 
the same subject; you have great authority if people are inclined 
to take your word as final, as settling the question. Authority is a 
matter of more or less weight being given to what you say in a small 
or large field; but “the” authorities on a subject include only those 
of great or near-great authority. 
Finally, the crucial question: what leads us to recognize a person 
as having authority? What leads us to suppose that a person really 
knows a lot about a topic? If we personally think we are knowledgeable 
about that topic, we can test the person, formally or informally- 
i.e., listen to what is said, and judge whether it reflects real knowledge 
or just pretense or bluster. In the academic world, we judge each 
other all the time, deciding that this person is “sound” on topic 
X ,  that person is a “light weight,” that other a crank, and that other 
one simply ignorant of the subject. But what about all those areas 
of knowledge that are outside our competence? I know nothing about 
Sogdian history; how can I tell who does? Unless I am completely 
gullible, I will not take the fact that a person claims to know all 
about Sogdian history as settling the matter; there has to be some 
better reason than that. 
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If we can’t ourselves independently judge whether or not a person 
is knowledgeable about a topic, we have to rely generally on 
reputation; if the person is thought to know a lot, we may go along 
with the general opinion. One other person’s opinion may be enough; 
if I trust my friend A, I may simply ask A who can be trusted on 
topic X. But my friend A may be going on reputation. Ultimately, 
reputation will be traced back to some people who claim to be able 
to evaluate knowledge claims directly-i.e., peers or people active 
in the same line of inquiry. If a person’s peers all think the person 
is knowledgeable, that provides a basis for reputation that others 
are likely to accept. This is not always the case, of course; a person 
may get a reputation which peers think is undeserved, and people 
may remain quite unknown even when they are well thought of by 
their peers. But by and large the social rule seems to be that specialists 
are the primary judges of specialists, and reputation outside the 
specialist group depends on reputation inside the group. That is 
not the whole story, though, as will soon be demonstrated. 
There is another basis for recognition of authority-performance. 
One may not be able to judge people’s knowledge in the area of 
their claimed competence, but they may be able to do things that 
convince one that they have special knowledge. If the doctor cures 
an illness, if the scientist makes predictions that can be seen as being 
fulfilled, that will provide a good reason for thinking that they have 
whatever knowledge i t  takes to do what they do. The performance 
test is not always available and not always conclusive; successful 
predictions might have been sheer luck, remission of illness might 
have been spontaneous. But performance often persuades more than 
anything else could, other than being able to tell by personal 
“examination” that a person knows something. We will come back 
to this point. 
Those college freshmen who are seeking personal cognitive 
authority in their fields are going to have to persuade “established” 
specialists that they have acquired specialized knowledge themselves; 
they are going to have to study hard, take advanced degrees, and 
do research of their own that can be evaluated by other specialists. 
Authority is a social phenomenon through and through. The hard 
work is necessary but not sufficient; everything depends on whether 
others come to think that “X is a good person [or even, the person] 
to ask if you have questions about that topic.” 
One can acquire cognitive authority in ways other than the 
academic route, but we can ignore these and concentrate on the 
academic world. There is clearly a role, albeit a very modest one, 
for bibliographic instruction to play in helping students work toward 
their goal of becoming “an authority in their field.” The more heavily 
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research in their field depends on library resources-rather than on 
experiment or observation or abstract thought-the more valuable 
will be knowledge of the bibliographic system. In some kinds of 
research, knowledge of the bibliographic system is practically 
indispensable, while in others one can get along with little or none. 
Naturally we want to help those who are interested in becoming 
“authorities in their field” by first persuading them that BI will 
in fact do them some good, but we must not exaggerate its utility. 
There is, however, another kind of connection between 
bibliographic instruction and cognitive authority. To make it, one 
has to distinguish between two kinds of knowledge associated with 
a field of inquiry. A person can be known as one who “has a wide 
knowledge of the literature” of a field without being recognized, 
or wanting to be recognized, as an expert (or even competent) 
practitioner in the field. And conversely, in many fields a person 
can be an expert in the field without having an especially impressive 
knowledge of the literature of the field. One might be a good economist 
or theologian without especially impressive knowledge of the 
literature of economics or theology; one might know those literatures 
without being an especially good economist or theologian, or being 
one at all. The practitioners claim to be good at developing and 
using the techniques of a field to discover new things and to be 
uniquely good at telling what is right and what is wrong with others’ 
work in the field. Practitioners’ knowledge is know-how: how to 
conduct research in a particular field, how to evaluate others’ work 
in the same field. One may lack, or disclaim having, a practitioner’s 
know-how and yet have a lot of “know-that,’’ knowledge of what 
the practitioners have produced in the way of writings. Experts in 
a field may generally be expected to have considerable amounts of 
both kinds of knowledge, but they are two distinguishable kinds. 
If practitioners’ knowledge is distinguishable from knowledge 
of “the literature,” what kind of knowledge is knowledge of “the 
literature,” and what good is i t? Knowledge of “the literature” of 
a subject is, in the first place, knowledge of the separate pieces of 
literature-i.e., the works that make up  the literature. It will probably 
not be knowledge of all the works in the field unless the field is 
a quite small one, but wide knowledge of a literature means at least 
wide acquaintance with the works in the field. What there is to know 
about the works making up a body of literature includes standard 
bibliographical information about publication, but this is of less 
importance than knowledge of works’ content, intertextual 
relationships, and position in the intellectual field. One cannot come 
to know a literature without having read it and understood it, hence 
to have come to know its content to some degree. Deeper knowledge 
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of content includes not just “what the work says” but how it  says 
it, and what it exemplifies or exhibits-that it is, say, an early 
application of a new technique or a prominent example of a certain 
intellectual style. Knowledge of intertextual relationships i s  
knowledge of the other works in relation to which the particular 
work is to be understood and its significance identified. Knowledge 
of a work’s position in the intellectual field is two-fold, depending 
on “stand” and on “standing”-i.e., on the “stand” taken with respect 
to a space of possible alternative stands or positions, and on its “social 
standing” in its field-crudely put, a matter of its reputation and 
influence. 
This is knowledge of “the literature” representing scholarly or 
scientific production. It might be the literature of a discipline, or 
a subdiscipline, or a specialty within a subdiscipline, or of the study 
(perhaps cross-disciplinary) of a particular problem or phenomenon; 
there are countless ways of isolating bodies of literature for study. 
And of course there are other literatures of which one can have 
knowledge, for example, “real” literature, that is novels, poems, plays, 
and the like, or primary source materials for study in some area- 
i.e., archives, public records, private correspondence, survey data, 
census records, etc. For any area in which a body of literature is 
produced, we can expect to find (at least) two different kinds of 
cognitive authority-authority in the area, the kind of authority 
claimed by practitioners and producers of the literature, and authority 
on the literature produced, a kind that can be acquired without being 
a practitioner in the area at all. 
Whatever the value of knowledge of the literature of a field may 
be for its possessor, its value to others is potentially enormous. I 
can ask a person who knows a body of literature well “Is there anything 
there that I should know about?” and hope that, once I have made 
it clear what my own interests and problems are, the other will be 
able to make connections between my situation and the literature 
of their field and steer me toward works that I might otherwise never 
have heard of. The crucial ability involved is the ability to see, or 
imagine, indirect or nonobvious relevances-i.e., the possible utility 
of works that have no obuious connection at all to my interests, which 
I would never have found by direct search because i t  would not have 
occurred to me to search for them. This ability, though marvelous, 
is not all that rare. Good librarians have it; graduate students may 
have it, helping faculty members by identifying potentially interesting 
material in regions unfamiliar to the faculty member. This is the 
kind of performance on which we are likely to base estimates of 
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the performer’s knowledge: if they can produce such useful things, 
they must know something worth knowing. This is a typical road 
to recognition as a cognitive authority. 
For our purposes, it is worth stressing that librarians, among 
others, can acquire a good knowledge of the literature of a field 
without taking an advanced degree in the field or otherwise acquiring 
a practitioner’s know-how. Such knowledge will be used on behalf 
of clients, but might i t  not also be used in instruction as well? There 
is the familiar straightforward job of showing undergraduates how 
to use the bibliographic system for whatever use that may be in their 
studies, and the more specialized job of showing advanced students 
how to use the specialized bibliographical resources of a field. But 
might there not be a further kind of instruction to give, aimed not 
at helping people become practitioners in a field but rather at studying 
bodies of literature? If there is, what in fact might it be, and why 
should anyone want it? 
If one knows a body of literature well, what one knows will 
include a very large amount of detailed particular knowledge, for 
example, about individual works and their characteristics. But that 
is not the kind of information that could be useful to attempt to 
pass on to others. One would not do it  in bibliographic instruction 
of the usual kind, where the objective is to show students how to 
use the bibliographical apparatus for course-related purposes or in 
aid of research in a field. Those who want to use the literature simply 
as a tool in their own research will not want to know more than 
is necessary for what may be very narrow purposes, so that the 
successful teacher would be the one who was careful not to burden 
them with more than they wanted to know. The same would be 
true if one were trying to help students come to know a body of 
literature; most of one’s detailed knowledge would not be worth trying 
to pass on to any except the few who were interested in that very 
same body of literature. But what could be the alternative? 
The teacher must have something general to give; one’s 
knowledge must support some interesting or useful generalizations, 
but what sort of generalizations? Might it take the form of a general 
theory of the structure, function, and growth of “bodies of literature” 
that could be taught to students seriously interested in mastery of 
some field of literature? Perhaps, but such a theory would first have 
to be invented. There is nothing of this sort yet available in the 
literature of bibliography or librarianship or information science. 
The nearest approach to such a theory seems to be Michel Foucault’s 
The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), a famous but abstract and 
difficult work that is hard to imagine serving as a textbook in an 
advanced BI course (compare, Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). In the 
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absence of a general theory, the appropriate level of generalization 
might be an account of structural and functional differences among 
various specific fields of inquiry-for instance, as has been suggested, 
“differences in the structures of the literatures in these areas [the 
humanities and the sciences], distinctive features of scholarship that 
characterize and shape these literatures, and distinctions between 
reference and access tools serving these disciplines” (Smalley & Plum, 
1982, p. 136). The notion of paying close attention to the structure 
of a body of literature, and structural differences among different 
corpora, has immediate attractions (quite independent of the now 
outmoded approach of the Structuralist Movement). Structural 
description seems appropriately general and poten tially useful and/ 
or interesting. 
What kinds of structure? A body of literature does not have just 
one structure, but exhibits multiple structures, depending on which 
of many different kinds of relationships one uses to define a structure. 
The subject matter divisions of a field give one kind of structure; 
the different genres or kinds of literature produced give another kind 
of structure. The division of the literature into “live” and “dead” 
gives another kind of structure. And yet other structures appear when 
one considers opposing methodological, theoretical, and ideological 
orientations. The division of a field into competing schools of thought 
or methodological camps is of ten the major division for insiders and 
outsiders alike. The social structure of the group of people who 
produce a body of literature may be reflected in the internal structure 
of that body of literature. Conflicts among groups consist of both 
social and bibliographical facts; so are “distances” among groups- 
communication and noncommunication, borrowing and lending. 
These are revealing facts of social and bibliographical structure. Such 
structures correspond to the “intellectual topography” of the field 
(Keresztesi, 1982), and identifying them is one of the most crucial 
elements in coming to grasp the character of a body of literature. 
If we are drawn to a structural approach to bodies of literature, i t  
should be with the understanding that there are many structures to 
be discovered in any single body of literature. 
The more potentially elaborate the study of structure becomes, 
the more preposterous i t  begins to seem to think of making it  the 
focus of a course of bibliographic instruction. For while one might, 
without difficulty, find a few relatively superficial things to say about 
the structures of the literatures of various disciplines, serious 
knowledge of structure requires a depth of knowledge of the literature 
that no one can be expected to have except, at most, in a few limited 
fields. But think of using one’s special knowledge of a limited field 
as an example from which lessons may be learned that will transfer, 
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by analogy at least, to other subject fields. Supposing that one is 
talking to a group of students seriously interested in exploring 
different bodies of literature, small or large. One can try to help 
them by exhibiting the variety of types of structure that can be found. 
One would not assume that all literatures exhibit the same kinds 
of divisions; one would want students to look for ways in which 
their own field of interest differed from the instructor’s exemplar 
field and from those of their fellow students. But concrete illustrations 
are always better than unadorned abstract description, and the simple 
fact of having a particular “model” field subjected to structural 
analysis would be a promising way of helping students execute their 
own analyses. 
How does one explore such structures? As i t  happens, 
bibliography is a natural tool for this purpose, and one used not 
merely to identify the separate works making up  a body of literature 
but to investigate the intellectual “topography” of that literature. 
Since bibliographical works are systematically organized, their 
organization can indicate something about the structure of the 
literature. Subject classifications made by those managing the 
bibliography of a discipline, for instance, can be expected to reflect 
the discipline’s current understanding of its own subject matter 
structure, and changes in the classification will reflect structural 
changes in the field. The simple size of classification sections shows 
something about the relative importance of different specialties 
within a field. When a bibliographical work does not directly show 
structural features of a literature, i t  may still provide information 
from which structure can be extracted, as a citation index allows 
one to uncover the life span of different parts of a literature, explore 
the relative standing of authors and individual works, and trace 
patterns of “exports and imports” from field to field. 
There are many specialized guides to the literature of different 
subjects which could serve as “textbooks” for the serious student 
in an advanced BI course. The instructor need not try to substitute 
lectures for these texts, but rather illustrate the use of bibliographical 
works in structural analysis, using the literature the instructor knows 
best as an example. In addition, there are the many already published 
writings describing structures of different literatures-the many 
citation studies and bibliometric studies of bodies of literature, for 
instance, as well as the many explicit discussions of the state of affairs 
within disciplines, evaluations of progress and prospects, critical 
analyses of whole schools, and histories of the development of 
disciplines. Some of these explicitly analyze bodies of literature, some 
are directed rather at doctrines and theories, procedures, results, and 
methodological disputes instead of at bodies of literature exhibiting 
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those features. All could be usable by one trying to construct a map 
of the topography of a literature. And steering students toward such 
material would be an important job for the instructor, involving 
more conventional instruction in the use of still other bibliographical 
works as tools to locate literature about bodies of literature. 
While bibliography seems naturally suited for use in the 
exploration of structures of literatures, i t  has its limits, which would 
have to be made explicit. For instance, one element that is generally 
lacking in standard abstracting and indexing services and current 
bibliographies (including library subject catalogs) is description of 
a work’s orientation or point of view or methodological position. 
From an indexing point of view it  is noteworthy that the MLA 
international bibliography (sometimes) indicates the “scholarly 
approach” of a work-e.g., “Marxist approach, archetypal approach.” 
It is noteworthy because it is not standard practice in all the fields 
in which such discriminations could be made; in other fields, 
bibliography may offer no direct picture of the methodological or 
ideological spectrum of the field. And there are numerous interesting 
bodies of literature that can hardly be approached through existing 
bibliographical apparatus at all. The bibliographical approach to 
the study of structures of literatures is not always effective, but it 
is, we must suppose, always worth trying. 
So it appears that there is an alternative approach in bibliographic 
instruction, aimed at the exploration of small or large bodies of 
literature, guided by a central concern for structural analysis. But 
what could be the good of such instruction? Who would want it? 
How could it substitute for a course taught by an expert practitioner 
of the field? And what’s i t  got to do with cognitive authority? A 
BI course would not be enough to make one an authority on any 
substantial body of literature-that takes time. And, in any case, that 
kind of authority is not the kind that students say they want; they 
want to be authorities in some field, not on its literature or the 
literature of some other field. So the advantages of this alternative 
approach are not apparent-but aren’t they? 
First, not even the largest university offers courses on all subjects 
that have a distinguishable body of literature; “taking a course” is 
simply not an option in most cases. More importantly, the idea that 
the only, or the best, way to study a subject is to “take a course 
taught by an expert practitioner of the field” is one that we have 
been trying to subvert. Practitioners of a field claim two kinds of 
special competence, as we have seen: (1) at using their field’s 
techniques, and (2)at evaluating work in their field. Let us concentrate 
on the second point-evaluation. Practitioners will claim that only 
practitioners can evaluate, or “properly” evaluate, work in their field; 
268 LIBRARY TRENDWWINTER 1991 
but why accept this? Others may evaluate their work in different 
ways than they do, but where is the justification for claiming that 
the others will be wrong when they differ from the practitioners’ 
evaluations? Practitioners may be uninterested in outsiders’ 
evaluations of their work, but the “social rule” mentioned earlier, 
that specialists are the primary judges of specialists, is not a social 
law that outsiders are not permitted to form their own evaluations 
of the specialists’ work. Are we to exclude in advance the possibility 
that the practitioners’ evaluations of their own work are mistaken, 
that they grossly exaggerate their success in acquiring new knowledge, 
that they are more like alchemists than like chemists? Practitioners 
may have their own ways of evaluating their own work, but there 
have to be other ways, and there are. 
We must insist that the kind of study of bodies of literature 
sketched earlier is just the kind of study that puts one in a position 
to make a personal assessment of the literature and of the status 
of the producers of the literature as well. Evaluation is to be distrusted 
when it  is uninformed; “serious” criticism and evaluation is informed 
criticism and evaluation. Evaluation based on close study of a body 
of literature is certainly informed evaluation. Knowledge of the 
content of the works constituting the literature, of their intertextual 
relations, and of their position in the intellectual field is as clearly 
relevant to evaluation as any kind of knowledge could be. Evaluation 
of a piece of the literature is clearly better when the particular work 
is seen in relation to the other works in the field; attempts at evaluation 
of a work in isolation are generally pointless. Seeing a work as part 
of a structured field is seeing it  in an appropriate context for informed 
evaluation. Seeing a structured body of literature as a whole is also 
a prerequisite for informed evaluation of the whole literature. The 
result of such an evaluation may, in fact, be the conclusion that those 
practitioners have nothing of value to offer, and that their insider’s 
evaluations are entirely untrustworthy (for a good example of this, 
consider the literary critic Frederick Crews’s [19861 critique of 
psychoanalysis). Practitioners’ knowledge and knowledge of a body 
of literature are not only distinct, they can also be competing bases 
for evaluation of a field of inquiry and its products. 
So bibliographic instruction of the kind proposed would give 
students a basis for independent evaluation both of a body of literature 
and of the status of “authorities in the field,” not by teaching students 
“how to evaluate” but by helping to put them in a position to make 
their own informed judgments of others’ claims to knowledge. Those 
judgments might be extremely tentative, but that would be 
appropriate; one never knows all there is to know that is relevant 
to evaluation, and evaluations must always be subject to revision. 
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But they must start somewhere, and independent examination of a 
body of literature is a suitable starting place. The idea that 
bibliographic instruction should make the student to some degree 
an independent agent is familiar; here the idea is extended, from 
independent ability to find information, to independent ability to 
evaluate what one finds. Others may come to recognize the value 
of one’s knowledge and one’s evaluations, and one might thus get 
some recognition as (to some degree, for some people) an authority 
on a body of literature. But this kind of cognitive authority is unlikely 
to be one’s direct goal; if it comes, it comes as an unsought byproduct 
of knowledge acquired for other reasons. Still, it is of interest to 
realize that bibliographic instruction, perhaps only a small aid in 
the quest for status as an “authority in one’s field,” can have quite 
another use-i.e., helping to put one in a position to be an 
independent assessor of others’ claims to cognitive authority. 
Now this looks remarkably like a central component of a general 
education aimed at increasing “students’ awareness of the products 
and processes of culture” and at developing “critical and independent 
thinking in preparation for lifelong self-directed learning,” as Frances 
Hopkins (1983, p. 20) described the aims of a second kind of 
bibliographic instruction-BI as a liberal art. In fact, what more 
generally applicable kind of study could one imagine? The kind of 
BI proposed here looks like a proper component of a liberal arts 
curriculum. If specialized professional education is the route to 
“authority in one’s field,” a liberal education should prepare one 
to question for oneself the status of the socially recognized authorities, 
rather than accept the status quo as given and unchallengeable. And 
the independent study of bodies of literature looks like a fine way 
of doing just that. 
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